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2ABSTRACT:
This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structu-
re. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the
national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges.
We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the
different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structu-
re and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing beha-
viour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We
attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding  to a set of
Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility
provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not intro-
duce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth.
KEY WORDS: Local government finance, tax deductibility, property tax.
CODIS JEL: H71, H23, C51
3RESUM:
Aquest treball contrasta algunes hipòtesis sobre els determinants de l’estructura
fiscal local. En concret, analitza els efectes que la deducció de l’impost sobre la
propietat residencial en la base de l’impost sobre la renda té sobre la utilització
relativa de taxes i de l’impost sobre la propietat residencial. Els incentius expe-
rimentats pels governs locals en relació a la utilització de diferents fonts
d’ingressos són analitzats mitjançant un model en el qual l’estructura fiscal i el
nivell de despesa pública local sorgeixen com a resultat del comportament ma-
ximitzador del polítics locals subjecte als efectes econòmics del sistema fiscal.
S’intenten contrastar les hipòtesis desenvolupades amb dades corresponents a la
utilització relativa de l’impost sobre la propietat residencial i les taxes d’un
conjunt de municipis espanyols durant el període 1987-91. Els resultats de
l’anàlisi empírica mostren que la deducció proporciona un incentiu a augmentar
els ingressos aconseguits de l’impost sobre la propietat però no introdueix un
biaix contra la utilització de taxes o a favor del creixement de la despesa local.
PARAULES CLAU: Hisenda local, deducció d’impostos, impost sobre la pro-
pietat
CODIS JEL: H71, H23, C51
4I. INTRODUCTION
This paper tests some theoretical hypothesis about the tax-setting beha-
viour of local governments. In particular, we focus on the effects that property
tax deductibility in the personal income tax of the central government has on the
relative use of the property tax and user charges. We attempt to test this hypo-
thesis with data corresponding  to a set of Spanish municipalities during the pe-
riod 1987-9l.The structure of the work is as follows: in the rest of section I we
review some related literature about the topic analysed and explain the basic
facts about spanish local public finance that have lead us to the develop this
study; in section II we sketch a theoretical model which allows to keep in mind
most of the factors introduced up to the moment; in section III we attempt to
test the developed hypothesis by means of a panel of data that includes 40 mu-
nicipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants in the metropolitan area of Barcelo-
na during the period 1987-91.
I.A. Review of the literature:
The empirical literature on local decision-making consistent with a ratio-
nal behavior of  political agents has been centered almost exclusively in the ex-
penditure side of the budget. Remarkable exceptions to this general tendency
are the works of Sjoquist [1981] and of Hettich and Winer [1984 and 1991].
The first two studies, both referred to the USA case, attempt to explain, respec-
tively, the use of the property tax by local governments, and of the personal in-
come tax by the states. The third  paper analyzes the mix of tariffs and public
debt in the Canadian federal budget during the last years of the XIX century.
The investigations of Inman [1985 and 1987] on the fiscal decisions of the big
USA cities are also especially remarkable. The work of Inman could be framed
in a wider group of studies generated soon after the USA debate about the re-
moval of  state and local tax deductibility in the federal income tax. Some outs-
5tanding works of this group are: Feldstein and Metcalf [1987], Holtz-Eakin and
Rosen [1987 and 1990], Lindsey [1987], and Gade and Adkins [1990].
The theoretical foundations of the literature on the determinants of the
local tax structure  are less solid and more recent than those that form the basis
of the empirical analysis of local public expenditure. In the first case, due to the
multidimensionality of the problem, the utilization of the median voter para-
digm (Sjoquist [1981]) is not appropiate. Some theoretical works (Hettich and
Winer [1988, 1997a, 1997b], Warskett, Winer and Hettich [1998], and Chernick
[1992]) base their modelling of tax decisions in recent results of the probabilis-
tic voting literature. In these models the fiscal structure is not determined by the
median voter preferences but by a weighting of the preferences of all the popu-
lation. This will be the option adopted in this study, as will be checked in sec-
tion II.B.
I.B. Changes in Spanish local public finance:
Empirical works on the determinants of local fiscal decisions are practi-
cally non-existent in the Spanish case. We could cite as an exception the works
of Monasterio and Suárez [1989] and of Bosch and Suárez [1993a, 1993b,
1994). Both works are centered  only in the determinants of the size of the local
public sector, and not in the use of the different tax sources.
However, most of the debate on Spanish local public finance since the
beginning of the eighties has been focused on the revenue field. The discussion
has been related to the need of giving sources of revenue to solve the historic
scarcity of resources of local governments. Two general solutions have been the
increase in the volume of financial aid from the central government and the ca-
pacity to decide the tax rates of local taxes up to a certain threshold.
6The municipal public finance reform carried out by the Local Government Act
of 1988 increased the possibilities of local financial autonomy  and modified the
structrure of revenue sources with the aim of simplifying the local tax structure
in some cases and of enlarging  revenue capacity in others. Residential property
tax, user charges, local business tax, and local motor vehicle tax are the main
tax sources available to Spanish municipal governments, accounting approxi-
mately for 1/3, 1/3, 1/5 and 1/10 of total tax receipts.  The remaining tax reve-
nue comes from a tax on land value improvements, a tax on building activities,
and some other minor taxes. In the early years of democracy, Spanish munici-
palities did not have any tax-setting power over these revenue sources. In the
second half of the eighties they were granted with the power to set the tax rates
of the various local taxes up and above a threshold. The Local Government Act
of 1988 was the confirmation of this process of tax-power devolution. The tax-
setting capacity of  Spanish municipalities is now considerable, since the bo-
ttom-top tax rate distance allows wide differences in tax liabilities between mu-
nicipalities (from 200% to 300%, depending on the tax). In addition to this, the
top tax rate has not been reached by almost any municipalities (See Solé Vila-
nova  [1990]). The fact that the municipalities can decide to use or not two of
the taxes - the tax on land value improvements and the tax on building activities
- also contributed to enlarge its tax-setting possibilities. Certainly, all these
factors impelled the growth of the public municipal sector. However, the initial
optimism has, to a certain extent, disappeared as the main tax sources caused
the citizenship’s disagreement1.
Financial aid to the municipalities by the central government also suffe-
red big changes soon after the Local Government Act went into effect. The two
main kinds of unconditional aid are a lump-sum grant and the possibility of de-
                                                          
1 For example, the many complaints received during the 1991 campaign of the residential pro-
perty value reassessment postponed the process until 1996 and introduced many doubts about
the main role that the property tax should play in the new municipal Spanish public finance.
7duction of some local taxes in the central ones. With regard to the grant, the in-
crease of resources has been very large2. On the other side, the effect of the in-
troduction of the property tax deductibiliy is more uncertain- although the loss
of revenue it supposes to the central government is also large3. It should be kept
in mind that this type of aid affects directly to the pockets of the citizens, while
it affects just indirectly, through a greater tolerance by the taxpayers to the in-
crease in the deductible tax, to the council’s budget.
Furthermore, as long as the unconditional grant and the deduction of the
property tax are not neutral respect to the municipal tax mix, the changes in un-
conditional aid introduced at the end of the eighties could have had  undesired
collateral effects. The first instrument, through the variable fiscal effort, could
have stimulated the utilization of taxes over user charges4. The deduction of the
property tax supposes a similar discrimination concerning non-deductible tax
sources. In fact, Solé Vilanova [1992] suggests that the deduction could be one
of the causes of the substitution of some user charges (refuse collection and
sewerage charges) by increases in the property tax.
Nevertheless, all these statements require an empirical validation. With
this objective, this work analyzes the evolution of municipal finance in the pe-
                                                          
2 Current grants and tax receipts are approximately 1/3 and 2/3 of total current revenues. The
unconditonal grant represents 4/5 of current grant funds. The amount of resources distributed
has nearly doubled since those years but its share in the budget has remained roughly the sa-
me, given the growth in tax receipts. Also the unconditional grant was institutionalized as a
formula grant. This has given more stability to municipal budget-making.
3 It has to be noted that th property tax deductibility is not the only deduction or credit of local
taxes allowed.The local bussiness tax is deductible in the calculation of the personal income
base tax or the corporate income tax base, depending on whether the taxpayer is a corporation
or not. Also, since the Local Government Act of 1988, the local tax on land value improve-
ments benefits from a 75% tax credit in the personal income tax.
4 A ¼ of unconditional grant is distributed according to the ratio between real receipts from
municipal taxes and potential receipts that the municipality could have reached if the
threshold tax rates had been settled. This is called the “fiscal effort” variable. Given that user
charges receipts are not included in this calculation, the grant could have provided incentives
for its removal. However, it must be noted that the grants’ distribution only follows the for-
mula for yearly increments above the status quo (see Solé Vilanova [1990] and [1992]). Con-
sidering this effect as negligible we will treat  this grant as a pure lump-sum one.
8riod 1987-91, focusing in the behavior of the residential property tax and user
charges. We should disentangle the variation of the property tax receipts and
user charges due to the effects of intergovernmental aid (the incentives to their
utilization implicit in the deduction), to the characteristics of the tax that make it
more or less desirable that other tax sources (the degree of progressivity, the
perception of horizontal inequity, the degree of distortion, or administration
costs) or to characteristics of the municipality, which explain the demand of lo-
cal public services (level of income, or resident population).
II. A POSITIVE MODEL OF  LOCAL TAX STRUCTURE
In this section two different aspects of the determination of local tax
structure are discussed. First of all, we pretend to identify the determinants of
the desired  volume and mix of the local budget at the individual level. In the
second place, individual preferences for the tax and local public expenditure
levels will be used in section II.B in order to analyze the equilibrium fiscal poli-
cy arising from a model of electoral competition. In the developed model the
equilibrium fiscal policy does not rely on the preferences of a single individual
(i.e. of the median voter) but is a weighting of the preferences of the different
individuals/groups. This model is used afterwards in order to analyze the effects
of tax exporting, comparing the results obtained to those of  the traditional stu-
dies on the effect of  tax deductibility.
II.A. Individual behaviour:
As a previous step to the study of local fiscal policy determination, in this
section we examine individual preferences for the tax system. It is supposed that
each individual derives utility from the consumption of a composite private go-
od, xi, housing services hi, and a good provided by the local government, gi -
determined from a function like gi=N-a.g, where N is the population of the mu-
9nicipality and g is the quantity of  local good. If a = 0, then the local good is a
pure public good, while if a= 1 it is a pure private one - each consumer gets a
share 1/N. The after tax prices of the x and h goods are px and ph , yi is personal
income net of taxation and transfers of  higher levels of government, and T is a
local head tax. Two are the main characteristics of this kind of tax: it is a lump
sum tax -therefore, the resulting excess burden is zero-, and the tax liability is
the same for each individual. We consider producer prices constant, taking the
value of one. Therefore, consumer prices are px=1+tx and ph=1+di.th , where tx
and th  are effective ad-valorem tax rates,and di is the property tax share borne
by the individual after the deduction in the central personal income tax, where di
=1-ti and ti is the individual’s marginal income tax rate.
Consider the election of tax and expenditure levels by each individual.
Could the individual impose her will, she will choose a vector of tax rates and a
level of expenditure to maximize her utility, subject to the  local government
budget constraint and her private good demand functions. We could define the
indirect utility function as:
              V(px   , ph   , y - T, g) = V(1 + tx , 1 + d .th  , y - T) + v(g)                      [1]
The local govenment budget constraint could be spelled as:
                          G = c.N-a.g = tx . X + th .H + T.N + S                                       [2]
where X and H are the overall tax bases of the jurisdiction, c is the unit cost of
provision and S  the unconditional aid received by the local government. The
problem of the individual is the maximization of  [1] subject to [2]. Since the
budget of the local government is balanced, just three of the four fiscal para-
meters (tx ,th ,T and g) constitute possibilities of free election for the individual.
In our case  the tax rates that burdens the two private goods (tx  y th ) and the
head tax (T) are selected as decision parameters, with public expenditure simply
adjusting so that the budget is balanced. The first order conditions for the solu-
tion of this problem  [Solé Ollé [1996)] lead to the following expression:
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To reach this result we have used  the properties of the utility function: Vx
= -a .x and  Vh=-a.h, where a=Vy is the marginal utility of income, and have
also forgotten cross-price effects. We have named the tax-shares of the indivi-
dual in the head tax and in the taxes x and h as mT=1/N, mx=x/X, and mh =h/H;
own-price elasticities of the X and H bases as Y x and Y h , and effective tax rates
as a share in after-tax prices as Jx =tx/(1+tx) and Jh=d.th/(1+d.th).
The left part of  expression [3] could be interpreted as the marginal cost
of provision of an unit of local public service in case of being financed by each
of the three tax sources available to the local government, while the right part of
the expression could be interpreted as the marginal benefit of the local public
service. That is to say, optimal effective tax rates for a given individual are tho-
se for which the cost of an additional unit of provision is equal for the different
tax sources and is simultaneously equal to the public expenditure marginal be-
nefit. We could see, starting from expression [3], how the marginal cost of local
service provision  relies on two different groups of factors. A first type of de-
terminants gathers supply factors: the unit cost of service production  (c), the
degree of publicity of the service (a) and  the population of the jurisdiction (N).
A second type of determinants of the marginal cost of provision depends on the
characteristics of the tax system available to the local government: the share of
the individual in the tax base (m), the percentage of the tax deductible in the tax
of a higher level of government (d), the own-price elasticity of the tax base (Y ),
and the degree of utilization of this tax (J)5. In the case of the head tax, the
marginal cost of public services depends only on the unit cost of provision, on
                                                          
5 In this case, given that the studied taxes are local, the distortion includes the effects of the tax
on the interjurisdictional mobility of the tax base. That is to say, besides the reduction in the
consumption of the taxed good, the elasticity of the tax base has also in bill the consumption
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the congestion parameter and on the population of the jurisdiction. The tax-
share is in this case 1/N and the distortion provoked by the tax is zero, thus the
marginal cost does not rely on the level of the effective tax rate neither on the
level of service provision to finance. These considerations imply, for example,
that although a low income individual could prefer the property tax over  a head
tax as a mean to finance the local government (given that for she d(h/H)<(1/N)),
as the level of provision of the service to finance grows she could accept the
utilization of the head tax if the distortion provoked by the property tax is large
enough.
The existing empirical literature on the estimation of local services de-
mand (Barr and Davies [1966], Borcheding and Deacon [1972], and Bergstrom
and Goodman [1973]) does not consider the possibility of financing local servi-
ces by means of distortionary taxation6. The assumption of  the tax base totally
fixed  is not consistent with the non-zero price-elasticities observed in empirical
studies of taxed goods demand. This means that the taxes used in the practice
are distorting, but that these distorting effects do not play any role in the un-
derlying model of collective  decision-making.The assumption of a fixed tax
base could be justified resorting to the argument that considers the individuals
"myopic" concerning the effects of  local tax policies; that is to say, that they do
not perceive appropriately the effects of  tax rates on the demands of the taxed
goods.Therefore, although they react to the fiscal incentive as consumers, they
do not keep that in mind when playing in the political market. However, an im-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that quits being carried out in the jurisdiction in order to be carried out in neighboring juris-
dictions.
6 These are just the pioneer works in the extensive field of research on the estimation of local
public goods demand. The interested reader could find theoretical revisions of the material in:
Inman  [1979, 1987], Rubinfeld [1987], and Wildasin [1986 and 1987]. The significance of
the tax distortions in the design of the tax system has been rigorously analysed by the optimal
tax theory literature, starting from the work of Diamond and Mirrlees [1971]. For an attempt
to connect the normative approach and the empirical studies on local public goods demand see
Wildasin [1988 and 1989].
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portant argument in favor of the introduction of distorting taxes exists in the
model. In the specification of our model, the individual decides simultaneously
the optimal level of service provision and tax rates. In this model, to difference
of other studies, each individual’s share in the payment is not considered exo-
genous, but comes determined by the same optimization process by which the
individual decides the level of service provision. The factor that allows to join
these two decisions are the distortions provoked by the different tax sources.
Observe that if none of the taxes are distorting the marginal costs of financing
by means of different sources will be constant and equal to the share of the in-
dividual in the cost of provision of a unit of service. In this case, the equilibrium
reached by the individual will consist in a given level of provision financed
with a single tax, regardless of the desired level of expenditure.
This could be easily seen  from the graphic representation of the model.
In figure 1 we present the level and mix of the equilibrium budget for a hypo-
thetical individual. We name Cx, Ch and CT the marginal cost of provision of a
unit of public expenditure financed by the taxes X and H, and the head tax, res-
pectively. B indicates the marginal benefit of the local public expenditure. The
aggregate  marginal cost function (CA) is obtained as the horizontal sum of the
marginal cost functions of each one of the tax sources7. The intersection
between CA and B, locus where Cx=Ch=CT, determines the optimal volume of
local public expenditure (G).The share of each one of the taxes in the revenue
                                                          
7 The marginal cost and benefit functions represented are lineal; this is only to simplify the
understanding of the graph. Note also that in order to carry out the graphic analysis the varia-
bles used are the receipts but not the tax rates. This solution is adopted in order to facilitate
the graphic analysis and because it is the option used subsequently in the empirical analysis, as
long as it has been impossible to obtain data on the effective tax rates. The utilization of the
receipts instead of effective tax rates introduce a small modification in the model. The receipts
are equal to the tax rate multiplied by the tax base. As we have seen previously, the marginal
cost valued at a given level of the tax rate is growing with the percentage that this represents
in the after-tax price. Therefore, the tax rate needed to obtain a given level of revenue is sma-
ller the wider the tax base. This implies that taxes with wider bases will have a marginal cost
function that will grow  less markedly upon the increase in the receipts.
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budget is determined by the intersection of the different marginal cost functions
and the equilibrium level of marginal benefit. Rx, Rh and RT indicate the re-
ceipts of the three tax sources.The budget equilibrium condition requires
Rx+Rh+RT=R=G.
Note how in the example of the figure 1 the tax with a lesser marginal
cost at a zero level of receipts is the property tax (H),  while the source with a
higher marginal cost in this point is the head tax (T). When  tax rates are zero,
the only difference between the marginal cost of the two taxes comes from the
differences in tax shares that the individual experiences for each source. Given
that the two taxes, X and H could hardly be more regressive than a head tax, we
infer that the graph represents a low income individual’s optimal budget.
However, given the growing marginal costs of the H tax, it soon quits
being the better tax for our individual. From the point where the marginal cost
of X and H are equal, the marginal cost function of the H tax grows faster than
the one of the X tax. From this point, the individual prefers to finance additional
increases of local public expenditure by means of the two taxes, with a growing
share of the H tax in the marginal increments of expenditure. Later on so-
mething similar occurs with the head tax. From a certain point, this tax presents
a marginal cost lower to the aggregate marginal cost function. Once this point
has been reached, the increases in public expenditure will be financed only with
this tax source. This is due to the stability of the head tax marginal cost, given
its absolutely non-distorting character. Note in the graph how the aggregate
marginal cost function has a flater slope than those of each tax, being more ho-
rizontal as the number of sources available to the local government increases.
Given the positive slopes of the marginal cost functions, the diversification of
tax sources allows to reduce the cost of financing increases in the local expen-
diture budget.
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The effects of residential property tax deductibility on the level and mix
of the local budget are showed in figure 2. The property tax marginal cost func-
tion moves downwards until Chd.This is due to two factors: in first place, the
burden of the tax borne by the individual decreases in the percentage of deduc-
tion; in second place, the deduction contributes to reduce the distortionary cha-
racter of the tax due to its effect on the J parameter of expression [3]. These
two factors make the marginal cost of the H tax  be lower than the one of the X
tax at higher levels of receipts with regard to the situation without deduction. It
could be observed in figure 2 how the X tax begins to be used at higher levels of
expenditure. This makes  the  aggregate marginal cost function also more hori-
zontal. However, it could be checked how still in the case of the deduction it
could be necessary to resort to the head tax to finance high levels of expenditu-
re. Although the deduction still stimulates the increase of the utilization of the
deductible tax, it does not mean (in the example of the figure 2) an increase of
local public expenditure. The only effect of the deduction is in this case the
substitution of  part of the receipts of the head tax (from RT to Rtd) by higher
receipts of the property tax (from Rh to Rhd).
This result contrasts with the conventional vision of the effects of tax
burden exporting to the non-residents in the jurisdiction on the level of local
public expenditure. With few exceptions, the literature on tax exporting gets a
clear conclusion: by transfering a share of  the local public burden to the non
residents, tax exporting stimulates higher levels of expenditure (Bird and Slack
[1983], Hogan and Shelton [1973], Ladd [1975], Oates [1972] and Zimmerman
[1983]). This conclusion is valid if the local government  had only one tax
source available  in order to finance its expenditure. In this case, the deduction
moves to a reduction of the marginal cost of  local public service provision and
therefore stimulates the growth of the local public expenditure depending only
on the price elasticity of its demand.
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This conclusion has been criticized by some authors (Wildasin [1988 and
1989]). From the results of the developed model it could be checked that, if the
local government had various tax sources at its disposal, the deduction could
stimulate the growth of public expenditure only in some  particular cases. If the
deductible tax is the tax utilized in the margin -or if the deduction converts it in
the tax used in the margin - the export of part of the burden of this tax will de-
crease directly the marginal cost of public expenditure and will in fact stimulate
the growth of expenditure. On the other hand, if the deductible tax is not the tax
used in the margin, the effect of the deduction on local public expenditure will
rely on the characteristics of the tax used in the margin. If this tax is absolutely
non distorting - as in the case of the head tax  shown in figure 1 - public expen-
diture would not be stimulated at all and the deduction will only mean a substi-
tution between tax sources. If the tax utilized in the margin is distorting, tax ex-
porting will stimulate local  expenditure, but not in the margin. The stimulus
comes from the minor necessity that, given the increase of the receipts of the
deductible tax, the local government has of exploiting the distorting taxes in the
margin so intensively in order to finance  public expenditure increases. The fact
that the marginal cost function of this revenue source has a positive slope means
that the deduction will move downwards the aggregate marginal cost8.
                                                          
8 It still exists another way by which the deduction of a tax -or the export of the tax burden in
general- could come to affect local public expenditure. If the income-elasticity of local publics
goods is positive, then the transfer of the tax burden to the non residents could stimulate the
public expenditure. If the income-elasticity is small or the exportable tax represents a reduced
share of individual income this effect will be also less important. It should be kept in mind
that the gain in real income of some individuals due to tax exporting represents a loss for
others. In the case of classical tax exporting the harmed are the individuals of other jurisdic-
tions. In the case of tax deductibility, the harmed are all the taxpayers of the country and not
only the residents in other jurisdictions. In absence of any hypothesis on the road utilized by
the higher level of government in order to finance the cost of the deduction it is not possible to
determine the sign of the income effects. See Buchanan and Pauly [1967]  for a discussion of
the balanced budget incidence of deductibility; see Morgan and Mutti [1983]  for a balanced
budget measurement of personal tax exporting in the case of  USA states. However, the inco-
me effect is not quantitatively significant; for example, Gramlich [1985] calculates the mag-
nitude of the income effect of the deductibillity of USA state and local taxes to be between
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The effects of lump sum grants also result somewhat different in this mo-
del than in the conventional model of demand of local public goods. Although
the income effect of lump sum grants does not change, the fact that the marginal
cost of receipts has a positive slope adds another possible via of influence of
grants on public expenditure.The grant (or any another local source of revenue,
considered as exogenously determined) reduces the use of other distorting sour-
ces of revenue. The smaller is the overall quantity to finance the smaller is the
aggregate marginal cost.Given that the desired level of public expenditure relies
on the marginal cost of obtaining public revenues, its reduction causes an in-
crease on expenditure higher than the usual income effect. That is to say, inter-
governmenal grants do not solve financial inadequacies of local governments
just because they give them additional resources, but because the share of grant
devoted to the reduction of taxation implies a decrease of the marginal cost of
public funds and, therefore an additional increase in the provision level of local
public services. According to some authors (Hamilton [1983], Wildasin [1984]),
this could contribute to explain the socalled "flypaper effect"; that is to say, the
reason why, in most empirical studies, the stimulative effects of lump sum
grants on local public expenditure are higher than those of  private income.
II.B. Collective behaviour
Given the diversity of preferences among individuals, local communities
should be capable to reach a single solution concerning the fiscal politicy to
adopt. It does not exist, however, any agreement on the correct specification of
a decision-making model at the local level. This paper models the budget deci-
sions of  local communities as the result of a process of electoral competition
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2.5% and 1% of family income depending on the marginal tax income tax rate being  50% or
20% , and with a share of the deductible taxes in family income of a 5%. In the Spanish case,
the same marginal tax rates applied to the residential property tax deduction (considering pro-
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between political parties. Some empirical works on local finance have used as a
theoretical basis the better known result of the formal political theory: the me-
dian voter theorem, attributed to Hotelling [1929] and Downs [1957]. In the re-
presentative democracy model of Downs the political preferences of voters are
represented along a single ideological  left-to-right dimension. It is supposed
that each voter has a unimodal distribution of preferences concerning this di-
mension. In these circumstances, if all the voters vote, and they vote for the
candidate whose platform is next to the policy that maximizes their utility, both
candidates will be allocated in the position preferred by the median voter.
However, the assumptions of this model are not very realistic and the conse-
quences of its abandonment radical. But maybe the most serious problem of this
kind of models arises as the number of dimensions where the candidates could
compete increases. In this case, "the equilibrium disappears and with him the
predictive power of the econometric models that used this concept of equili-
brium" (Mueller [1989, pp.196])9. The practical solution adopted by the theore-
tical and empirical work on the determinants of public expenditure and revenue
is usually the simplification of the problem, reducing the different political di-
mensions to one10.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
perty tax receipts a 1% of family income) would represent between 0.5 and 0.1% of family
income.
9 Some authors have tried to extend the result of the median voter model to a multidimensio-
nal space (See, for example, Plott [1967]  and Davis, DeGroot and Hinich [1972]). These
works gives "generalized median voter theorems", establishing the existence of equilibrium in
elections with two political parties at median locations defined in unidimensional subsets of
the political space, whenever certain assumptions are satisfied about the preferences of voters.
Unfortunately, "the assumptions used in order to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium are
extremely restrictive, so restrictive that we expect that they will be hardly ever completed"
(Feldman and Lee [1988, p. 205]).
10 This is, for example, the tactics of Meltzer and Richard [1981 and 1983]; they assume that
redistributive politics is carried out through only two instruments: a lump sum subsidy that
benefits all the individuals and a proportional income tax. Given the budget constraint, the
election of the tax rate determines the quantity of the lump sum subsidy. Therefore the pro-
blem is unidimensional and, in equilibrium, the combination subsidy-tax favored by the me-
diam voter is elected. However, this assumption reduces the capacity of adaptation of Meltzer
and Richard's model to the different empirical phenomenons  related to the issue of redistri-
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In the model developed in section II.A, the simultaneous determination of
public expenditure and tax rates of three sources (X, H yand the capitation tax,
T) makes  the dimension of our problem  three. The preferences of the median
voter would determine the equilibrium fiscal policy only in very particular si-
tuations. Therefore, the spatial deterministic voting model is not suitable for our
empirical purposes. With the goal of avoiding the necessary restrictive
assumptions in order to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium in models of
deterministic voting, some authors have began to utilize probabilistic models of
elections, in which the individuals vote according with a probability function
based on their preferences, and the political parties maximize the expected
number of votes.11
Suppose that the two political parties that compete for local office [the
party now in the government (g) and the challenger  (o)] choose their strategies
in a situation of uncertainty. The voters form expectations on their utility under
the victory of each of the two candidates.We can write, therefore, the utility that
                                                                                                                                                                                    
bution.Their work is only able to explain the causes of vertical redistribution (from rich to
poor or vice versa) but is not able to approach the problem of horizontal redistribution; it
could not give any evidence about the hypothesis according to which the redistribution is pro-
duced in favor of the middle class and in detriment of the tails of the distribution, well-known
like the "law of Director" (Stigler [1970], Tullock [1971]). A model that has as variables of
election by the political parties the net fiscal balances (taxation less transfers) of the N indivi-
duals of a community would have a dimension N-1; for this type of models it does not exist a
equilibrium in a deterministic spatial model of political competition (Coughlin [1986],
Flowers [1981]). Another possible via it of simplification is that adopted by Sjoquist [1981] in
his analysis of the utilization of the property tax by USA local governments: he considers as
exogenous one of the dimensions - in this case the local public expenditure - arguing that its
determination is totally independent of  the tax-setting process. In this case, with only two tax
sources and the level of expenditure constant, the budget constraint reduces the problem to
one dimension. However, the adoption of this type of solution carries out an important pro-
blem: the median voter model becomes an "artifact" (Hinich [1977]).
11 The first probabilistic voting models were used in order to study the effects of the absten-
tions on the equilibrium in the spatial deterministic model (see, for example: Hinich, Ledyard
and Ordeshook [1972] and McKelvey [1975]). Other probabilistic models of bipartisan com-
petition without abstentions are: Hinich [1977], Coughlin [1986 and 1992], Coughlin and Nit-
zan [1981a], Lindbeck and Weibull [1988], and Feldman and Lee [1988]. In most of these
works, the equilibrium results are obtained without carrying out the restrictive assumptions of
the deterministic model.
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a voter gets from the victory of each of the two candidates as Ui(pg) and Ui(po),
where pg and po are the electoral platforms of the two parties. We could introdu-
ce uncertainty in the model supposing the existence of other individual factors,
not related directly with the fiscal policy platform of each party, that rely on the
ideological identification of each individual, on personal characteristics of the
candidates, on historical factors, or on other dimensions that could appear as
important during an electoral campaign. These factors remain included in a re-
servation utility level, named ei.The term ei could be understood as the expected
loss of utility because of the fiscal policy that is necessary so that a given indi-
vidual changes her vote. These terms, that vary from individual to individual,
are not known with certainty by the politicians. It is supposed that the parties
infer them from a density function fi(e) (and its corresponding distribution
function, Fi(e)). In this case, the probability that a given individual votes for the
party in office will be Pi g  (pg, po)=1  if Ui(po).- Ui(pg) < ei  and Pi g  (pg, po)=0
otherwise.
Each political party chooses its electoral platform with the objective of
maximizing the expected margin of victory, ignoring the impact that its election
will have on the performance in future elections. The solution of the problem
for the party in office could be represented, in the concrete case of the model
developed in section II.A, as the maximization of the following expression:
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The formulation of the problem is exactly simetric for the challenger. It
could be demonstrated (Lindbeck and Weibull [1988], Coughlin, Mueller and
Murrell [1990a]) that, whenever the distribution function satisfies certain pro-
perties, the simultaneous solution of this problem by the two candidates forms a
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Nash equilibrium in which the platforms of the two parties have to be the sa-
me12. Then, from the first order conditions of  [4] the next expression follows
(see Solé Ollé [1996]):
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Where bi  is the mean of function Fi(e), that is, bi is the “expected reser-
vation utility level” or “expected partisan bias” for each individual. The conclu-
sion obtained from the results of this model of bipartisan competition is simple
and easily understandable: each party acts as if it maximizes an objective func-
tion that is a weighted sum of  utilities of  all the citizens. The equilibrium in
this multidimiensional context is not located at the ideal point of the median
voter, but in a weighted mean. The weights received by each individual depend
inversely on her expected bias in favor of one or the other party. In equilibrium,
both parties will favor  the voters whose partisan biases are minor -for which
f(bi ) is greater-. That is to say, redistributive politics will tend to equalize the
yields obtanined from the benefits distributed to the different individuals; with
this purpose in mind, politicians will both worry about the loss of utility for the
individual because of the budget decisions and about the probability that the
voter would be induced to change her vote. In this model, the voters that deter-
mine the fiscal policy are then the marginal or swing voters.
In this model, the comparative statics of the tax deductibility provision
are not yet the same than those predicted in section II.A. It is still true that de-
ductiblity reduces the property tax burden borne by residents. However, now the
introduction of the deduction also causes an exogenous redistributive shock.
                                                          
12 Lindbeck and Weibull [1988] demonstrate the existence of equilibrium whenever the den-
sity function is unimodal, symmetrical and translate; that is to say, that the function has a sin-
gle maximum, that fi(xi)=fi(-xi), and that fi(xi )=f(x +bi). Given the symmetry of the density
function, bi is at the same time the expected mean and median for the term ei, named by the
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That means that after the deduction the net pattern of incidence of the deducti-
ble tax has changed. Suppose, for example, that the residential property tax lia-
bility grows and population weights decrease with income level13. Let’s suppose
now that the deductibility provision is introduced. Because of that, the net pro-
perty tax incidence pattern becomes more regressive. This pulls politicians out
of the redistributive equilibrium. To maximize electoral support they have to
change the tax mix against the property tax. However, to reduce the bud-get
share of the property tax  this redistributive effect should be greater than the
traditional incentive effect. If the population weights would increase with inco-
me level, the redistributive and the incentive effect will work in the same direc-
tion: increasing the use of the residential property tax.
Traditional empirical works on the effect of tax deductibility on the utili-
zation of the different tax sources and on local public expenditure tend to intro-
duce some proxy of the average d effect.  However, they forget the redistributi-
ve effect, possibly a significant feature of tax deductibility. Therefore, we will
introduce in the empirical analysis of section III a measure of the inequality of
the income distribution and of the redistributive shock caused by the introduc-
tion of the deduction. However, as we have explained, we could not make any
prediction on the sign of these variables. If population weights decrease with
income we must expect that municipalities with a more unequal income distri-
bution would use  the property tax more and user charges less, while the intro-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
authors as "expected partisan bias" in favor of the party in office for the individual i. The logit
and probit density functions satisfie these properties.
13 Residential property tax incidence is a problem for which the economical literature does not
have a unique answer; for some authors, the tax is regressive (it is the denominated "traditio-
nal vision", that considers that the tax is borne in proportion to housing consumption - see
Netzer [1966] and Musgrave [1974]), while for others is progressive (it is the denominated
"new vision", that considers that the tax is borne by capital owners in all the economy - see
Mieszkowski [1974]). The results of the new vision are based on the development of general
equilibrium models; although this is surely the correct form of keeping in mind the economi-
cal effects of the tax system, its utility in the modelling of redistributive politics issues is not
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duction of the deduction will cause two effects of opposite sign: a positive in-
centive effect and a negative redistributive effect. If population weights increase
with the income level municipalities must utilize user charges more than pro-
perty taxes, and the introduction of the deductibility must provoke two positive
effects on the relative use of the property tax.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
III.A. Econometric especification
The objective of this section is the specification of an empirical model of
local fiscal decision-making  that will allow us to test the different behavioural
hypothesis derived from the comparative static properties of the model develo-
ped in section II.
The random variables to study are the property tax (P), user charges (U),
and total current revenue(R) accrued to Spanish municipal goverments. The user
charge variable includes the sewerage charge, the refuse collection charge, the
price of water delivery and some other minor charges. The item total current
revenue includes property tax and user charges receipts, and also the receipts
from the local business tax, local motor vehicle tax, tax on land value improve-
ments, other minor taxes, and current grants.
The election of property tax and user charges in order to carry out the
empirical analysis  is based on two fundamental reasons. First, the principal
hypothesis to be tested centers in the property tax: the property tax deductibility
is the feature that will allow us to analyze the incentive effects of higher level
tax dispositions on the local tax and expenditure decisions. Although, and as we
have yet noted, there are other tax credit and deductibility provisions in the
Spanish case,  the property tax deductibility is the only one that provides us
                                                                                                                                                                                    
so clear: the common opinion in the various empirical papers of this kind is that the residential
property tax is regressive or, at least, it is perceived as regressive by the individuals.
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enough municipal variability to perform an accurate test14. Second, the redistri-
butive conflict at the municipal level is focused on the mix between these two
revenue instruments. The refuse collection charge, the sewerage charge, and in
some cases the price of water delivery have been items of revenue whose pre-
sumed regressivity have been sometimes alleged by party politicians and citi-
zens.
The data used in order to carry out the analysis come from 40 municipali-
ties of more than 10,000 inhabitants belonging to the area surrounding Barcelo-
na during the period 1987-91. Although the readiness of the data has been the
key for the election of the set of municipalities, the presence of  sufficient va-
riation  in the tax variables is a desirable characteristic of our data set. It should
be noted that this group of municipalities shows, for the period under the study,
one of the most dynamic fiscal behaviours among all the Spanish municipalities.
For this same reason, the conclusions of the study can be extended to the re-
mainder of Spanish municipalities only with much caution. Equally, the selected
years cover a period in which a big change in the Spanish municipal public fi-
nance occurred: it went into effect the Local Municipal Act of 1988. Although
this fact hinders the econometric analysis to carry out, it allows us to examine a
natural experiment in order to analyze the effect of the introduction of the pro-
perty tax deductibility.
With the aim of taking the size of the analyzed municipalities in conside-
ration, the (P, U and R) are divided by the resident population of the municipa-
lity (P/N and U/N). Also, in a second specification, P and U are expressed as
their share in total current municipal revenue (P/R and U/R).
                                                          
14 Note, for example, that the 75% tax credit of the local tax on land value improvements is
common to all the municipalities; the deductibility of the local business tax in the corporate
tax is made also at the common proportional tax rate of 35% and, of course, only operates if
the business has profits. The lack of cross-section variability, thus, precludes any empirical
analysis that relies in those sources of taxation. This does not mean, of course, that there are
not important incentive effect at work in these cases.
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The developed hypothesis suggests that the use of a revenue source relies
on the possibility of exporting part of its burden to the no residents or to resi-
dents in the municipality whose perception of the burden or whose participation
in the local political process is smaller. Following this argument we could think
that P/N and U/N could be higher in municipalities with higher: share of com-
mercial or industrial property (Inman [1988]),  share of rental housing, or share
of second homes. None of these variables are available for all the years of  the
studied period, and therefore  they will not be included in the model. As it will
be shown later on, the econometric model will try to solve the omission of these
variables.
The property tax exporting possibilities of a municipality depend to a
great extent on the  effective tax share borne in the margin by each resident as a
consequence of their possibility of deduction. We consider that 1990 is the first
year of property tax deductibility by residential property owners in the taxable
income of the  personal income tax of the central government15. We proceed to
calculate the average effective marginal share of the property tax (dm). The
construction of  dm is carried out starting from aggregate municipal information
on the taxable income distribution of each municipality. We have information
on the taxable income and on the number of taxpayers for the groups of taxpa-
yers with taxable income  from 0 to 0.5 million pta., from 0.5 to 1.5, from 1.5 to
3, and with more than 3 million pta. With this information, dm is calculated for
                                                          
15 This possibility was in fact introduced by the Local Government Act of 1988;  after this
year, the owners could deduct the residential property tax paid on occupied housing, second
houses and also vacated houses. The last two possibilities have been removed in 1995.
Owners of rental housing and business could deduct the tax before 1988. That means that the
deductibility was already permitted in the 1988 income tax filling procedures. However, as the
local council uses to pass yearly tax changes about three months before the beginning of the
fiscal year (September-October) and the Local Government Act was passed on December of
1988, the local tax rates for 1989 were already in effect and local governments had to wait
until next year to change its fiscal policy. Thus, the reaction of local governments to the si-
muly provided by the introducction of the property tax deductibility could not took place befo-
re fiscal year 1990.
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the years  1990 and 1991. The value of  dm for the years 1987, 88 and 89 is one;
that is to say, given that the property tax was not deductible yet, the resident
population borne in the margin a 100% of its tax burden.
The first step for the construction of  dm is the calculation of the first
deductible pta. marginal tax rate (tiM) for each one of the taxable income groups
in each municipality. This is done by matching each group with its marginal
income tax rate according to the 1990 and 1991 scales.With this information we
obtain the value of d  for each  group (i) and municipality (M) as: diM=1-tiM . The
second step to carry out is the calculation of  dm as an average of the several diM
weighted by the relative frequency of resident population in each one of the
groups. In order to carry out this calculation we use the four groups cited plus
an additional group that corresponds to the population without tax liability,
whose marginal income tax rate is zero.The reason for the inclusion of this last
group is the fact that all the population of the municipality with right to vote
enters in the politicians objective function. The expression used is the
following:
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where niM  is the number of taxpayers in the group i in the municipality M, while
NM is the resident population of the municipality.
This approach to the measuremet of the effect of the deduction on the
effective burden share has been utilized by several authors in the analysis of the
USA tax deductibilty (Inman [1988] and Gade and Adkins [1990]). However,
other authors calculate dm starting from  individual tax data (see Lindsey [1987]
and Feldstein and Metcalf [1988]). Given the difficulty of this last approach, the
first possibility has been used in this paper16.
                                                          
16 This methodology seems more suitable in the Spanish case than in the previous USA stu-
dies. The reason is that in the Spanish case the residential property tax deduction is allowed to
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With the aim of testing the local govenment redistributive politics hypo-
thesis  we must develop a measure of the distribution of individuals by income
groups for each municipality, as well as a measure of the pattern of tax inciden-
ce for each of the taxes. Some empirical papers treat the income distribution of
each municipality including as variables the share of individuals in some inco-
me percentils. For example, Inman [1988] includes as a variable pretending to
measure the influence of high/low income individuals, the share of individuals
whose income is higher/lower than the 75/25% of the national income. In our
case, besides of having available information on the number of income tax pa-
yers by income group, we also have information on the distribution of taxable
income by groups. With the purpose of using all the available information, we
have constructed a synthetic index. Concentrating all the income distribution  in
a single value has a drawback: if the redistributive pattern implicit in the local
tax policy is non-monotonic - that is to say, if it does not distribute from rich to
poor or vice versa, but follows, for example, Director's law - it is then possible
that our index is not well devised. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to find non-
monotonic redistributive patterns given the revenue sources analysed (property
tax and user charges). The synthetic index calculated  is the index of Fisher-
GM(Y) -, that indicates us the degree of skewness of the income distribution. The
expression used for their calculation is the following:
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all taxpayers. In the USA case the deductibility could only be used by the taxpayers whose
itemized deductions overcome the standard deduction. The share of itemizing taxpayers is
quite small and concentrates in high income levels. The calculation of an indicator of d m for
the local USA governments requires an estimate of the share of itemizing taxpayers by income
group. The maximum level of detail of this information is at the state level. This implies that
the same value is used for every local government of the same state. For an analysis of the
main features of USA tax deductibility see, for example: Noto and Zimmerman [1983 and
1984], Oakland [1986], and Kenyon [1986 and 1989].
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where yM  is taxable income per capita in the municipality, yiM  is taxable income
per taxpayer in each one of the four groups of income, and VM(y)  is the variance
of the income distribution in the municipality, calculated by means of a similar
procedure to that described for the index of Fisher.
The calculation of a  property tax incidence measure presents more diffi-
culties. It has not been possible, due to data limitations, to calculate an inciden-
ce measure for this tax at the municipal level. To solve this we have introduced
a proxy of the main distributive shock that could have experienced this tax in
the period of study. It is supposed that, to a great extent, the variation in the
pattern of property tax incidence during the period of study depends basically
on two factors: the external distributive shock caused by the introduction of the
deductibility of this tax, and the increasing dispersion between the fiscally as-
sessed property values (named "valor catastral") and the market values of pro-
perty. This second factor relies on the time period elapsed between property
value assessments. The first of the factors will be approached using a synthetic
index of distribution of the effective after deduction property tax share, dm. Also
in this case the Fisher’s index of skewness for this variable is calculated -G(d)-,
using an expression similar to [7]. Given that this variable falls monotonically
with income, the utilization of a single value does not involve any problem.
The second factor is introduced into the model by  the calculation of the
ratio of assessed value and market value of property (av/v). It is supposed that as
this ratio decreases it increases the difference between the ratios corresponding
to high market value lots against those corresponding to low market value ones,
with the corresponding increases in the regressivity of the property tax17.
However, the utilization of this proxy is a very imprecise form of keeping in
mind the effect of the property tax regressivity increase due to the no-realization
                                                          
17 Although this has not  been demonstrated yet, see the article on "Catastro" journal:  "Market
valuet and assessed value in the big Spanish cities" [1992] for empirical evidence of differen-
ces in the assessment ratios between districts of a same city.
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of periodic assessment campaigns. This is due to the fact that as time elapses
between assessment campaigns not only vertical equity of the tax worsens, but
also probably horizontal equity is affected. This could also be a factor that
works against the utilization of the property tax. Therefore, the variable (av/v)
could gather the effects of the regressivity increase but also the effects owed to
the increase in taxpayer perceived tax unfariness. The possible biases caused by
the omission of other structural factors that determine the incidence of the pro-
perty tax could be handled with of the utilization of a appropriate method of es-
timation, as will be shown.
We have also included in the model the ratio of housing market value and
municipal family income. This variable tries to reflect the effect of relative base
size on the use of  the tax. We show in the section II how the slope of a tax
marginal cost was minor how much greater it was the size of its base relative to
the other tax base available to the other government. Family income pretends to
pick up the size of those other bases as, for example, number of motor vehicles
or local business activity.
The remaining of variables are included in the model basically to account
for its direct effects on local public services demand. These variables are: fa-
mily income per capita (Y), resident population of the municipality (N), current
lump sum grants per capita (S), and other exogenous revenue gotten by the mu-
nicipality (M). We have considered exogenous those revenue sources that do
not affect the process of political calculation carried out by the municipal go-
vernment because their receipts depend basically on factors related with the
economical structure of the municipality or their burden is  not perceptible by
the citizens. All revenue sources other than the residential property tax, user
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charges, the motor vehicle tax and the local business taxes (included in the va-
riable "all current revenue") are included in this category18.
The model to be estimated could be expressed as a part of a structural
model of three equations, where the endogenous variables are pjt (accrued resi-
dential property tax receipts, per capita - Pjt/Njt - or as a ratio over total current
tax revenue, Pjt/Rjt), ujt  (accrued user charge receipts, also per capita - Ujt/Njt - or
as a ratio over total current tax revenue - Ujt/Rjt), and rjt (accrued total current
revenues per capita, Rjt/Njt).
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where j indicates municipality and t year, and Jj, Jj*, Jj** and Tj, Tj*, Tj** repre-
sent respectively municipality and time especiffic effects for each equation. The
estimation of the fixed effects model by three stage least squares (3SLQ) will
give us consistent estimates of the parameters whenever the individual effects
are correlated with the explanatory variables included in the equation  (Mundlak
[1978]). Municipal fixed effects represent specific circumstances of each muni-
cipality that stay relatively constant during the analysed period: characteristics
                                                          
18 The data used in order to estimate the model  has been obtained from various statistical
sources.The data on income tax and taxpayers by income group is from the Tax Statistics
Office, Ministry of Economics and Finance. The data on municipal family income (Y) has
been obtained from Arcarons et alt. [1991]:  "Estimation of family income of counties and
municipalities of Catalunya." The data on property tax receipts, of housing assessed values are
from the Center for Catastral Cooperation and Tax Administration": "Real Estate Tax. Urban
real estate", from various years; the remaining budgetary data is from yearly surveys of the
Service of Economical Municipal Information of the Diputación of Barcelona. The data on
price per square metre of housing on sale has been obtained from the market studies of Tecni-
grama, for the various years under study.
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of the local political market, specific differences in the cost of local public ser-
vices, or in our case structural possibilities of tax exporting. The estimation of
the model with a cross-section of data would require the introduction in the mo-
del of variables accounting for all those three sets of structural factors. Otherwi-
se, if these were correlated with the variables included in the model, the obtai-
ned parameters  would be inconsistent  (Holtz-Eakin [1986]). That is to say, the
use of fixed effects will lessen the problem of the low quality of the information
available in the Spanish case in order to estimate this type of models.
This is not, however, the only advantage of  the use of panel data in our
case. Another advantage is the increase of the degrees of freedom of the model.
The number of observations is 200 (40 municipalities during 5 years); this
allows us to estimate the model without having to provide information of a
greater number of municipalities. The third advantage lies in the possibility of
working jointly with cross-section  and time-series variation. The model uses
several variables built from income indicators - dm, and G(Y), G(d ) - Because of
that, the probability that we meet with a multicollinearity problem is quite high.
That is to say, given the structure of the problem to study it was possible that
with a cross-section we would not have been able to separate one effect from
the other. For example, using a panel of  data, and taking advantage of the fact
that  property tax deductibility comes into effect in 1990, we manage to give to
the variables dm and y a very different look - the first is equal to one for all the
municipalities in 1989, and to a value less than one in 1990, different for each
municipality; the second has a different value for all the municipalities in the
two years-. Something similar occurs with the variables G(Y) and G(d) - the se-
cond raises from 0 in 1989 for all the municipalities, to a positive different va-
lue in 1990-. In a cross section for the years 1990 and 1991 the variables dm and
y, and G(Y) and G(d ) would be highly correlated.
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III.B. Econometric results
Given the incompletness of the model in its structural form we have not
tried the estimation of the rjt equation. Instead, we carry out, first, the estimation
of the three equations in a reduced form, obtained from the substitution of rjt in
the equations of pjt and ujt (table 1) and, second, the estimation of the structural
equations of pjt and ujt (table 2). The reduced form of the model has been esti-
mated by  a "seemingly unrelated equations" (SURE) model, with the aim of
keeping in mind the shocks common to the three equations. In a conventional
model this would not have been necessary, since it is well known that when the
explanatory variables are the same in the different equations the combined esti-
mate does not give any efficiency gain in the parameter estimates over the ordi-
nary least squares estimation of each equation. However, this is not so in a fixed
effects model (Hsiao [1986], p.103). The two equations in the structural form
are jointly estimated  by means of 3SLQ, using the exogenous variables of the rjt
structural equation as instruments. We have enough available instruments (yjt,
Sjt, Njt and Mjt,) given that the only endogenous explanatory variable in the pjt
and ujt equations is rjt.
The explanatory capacity is quite good in most of the estimated equa-
tions, with adjusted  R2 over 0.5. The hypothesis of different intercepts for each
municipality is accepted at the 99% confidence level. Also the hypothesis of
correlation of the fixed effects with the variables of the model is accepted at the
99% confidence level  (the Hausman Test is overcomed in the different equa-
tions, refusing the utilization of a random effects model in all of them).
It could be checked how the deduction has a significant effect on  the use
of the property tax. The sign of the dm variable is, as we expected, negative in
the equations whit P as left hand variable. Given the mean values of dm and p,
the effective share elasticity of property tax receipts is approximately one. Ove-
rall tax receipts also respond with the expected sign to deductibility. However,
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given that the parameter is estimated very imprecisely (it is significant only at
the 85% confidence level) it would result rash to conclude that the deduction
has stimulated the growth of municipal public expenditure and not just a subs-
titution between revenue sources. Even if we could accept this result, the para-
meter estimate for the dm variable in the model in the reduced form is higher in
the property tax equation than in the user charges one. Given that the parameter
in the use charge equation  is not significant, other revenue sources not directly
analysed by the model (motor vehicle and local bussines taxes) should have
suffered a reduction in their usage because of the property tax deduction. If that
is the case, the deduction could not be blamed of the removal of some user
charges: maybe the answer lies in administrative cost factors (see Solé Vilanova
[1992]) that have not been possible to consider in the model. The different esti-
mates carried out give partial evidence about the redistributive politics hypothe-
sis developed in section II.B. The skewness of income distribution -GM(Y) -  is
significant in the three equations in reduced form and in all of the structural
form equations to exception of the property tax share equation (p=P/R). A
greater income skewness implies a minor utilization of user charges and a grea-
ter utilization of residential property tax. The effect on the total tax receipts is
also positive, although not significant. This seems to suggest that local go-
vernments have a pattern of wheights falling with income level. The results ob-
tained for the property tax incidence variable are less clear. They present a sig-
nificant and positive parameter in the reduced form equations p and r.The pa-
rameter from the u equation also results positive although not significant. This
result means that, in spite of the fact that the local governments use a wheigh-
ting pattern falling with income, the property tax regressivity increase has pro-
voked an additional increase of its utilization.
The ratio of assessed values and market values of housing (av/v) results
significant in most of the equations. Its signs are the expected: as the bias in-
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creases, the use of the property tax  decreases and the utilization of user charges
and other tax sources included in the variable r increases. Note how in this case,
the pattern obtained is very similar to that for the income distribution variable:
property tax and user charges appear as substitutes. The variable of  relative ba-
se size (v/y)  is significant in  every p equation and has the expected sign in the
u equation. That is to say, a higher relative property tax base implies a greater
utilization of the residential property tax and (with some caution) a minor utili-
zation of user charges. However, given that this variable is not significant in the
r equation,  one could expect a substitution between sources (motor vehicle and
local business taxes) as the distoritonary effect of increases in the property tax
increases.
For the remaining  variables of the model, included as determinants of the
level of desired provision of local public services the results are as follows: fa-
mily income -Y- is significant and with the positive expected sign in the p and r
equations. The negative sign in the u equation is not significant but still is quite
surprising. A possible interpretation is that user charges are a relatively inferior
revenue source. Population does not result significant in any of the equations.
Current lump-sum transfers have the expected positive sign in the r equation
and the estimated parameter implie that of each 1,000 pesetas received by the
local government 718 become a current revenue increase. It seems, therefore,
that the relevance of the “flypaper effect” can be rejected in this case. The diffe-
rence between both quantities does not mean a reduction of user charges or pro-
perty tax: other taxes (or maybe a reduction in debt finance) would be benefited.
It can also be noted that exogeous revenues  have an effect on current revenue
less stimulant than intergovernmental grants,  but they are not translated to a
reduction of the property tax and user charges receipts.
Finally, we should highlight the outputs of the r variable in the structural
model. This variable is significant in the share equations, but not in the per ca-
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pita receipts equation. The parameter is negative in all the equations, indicating
that both residential property tax and user charges are relatively inferior sources
of revenue; that is to say, that their relative  (significant at 99% level) and ab-
solute usage (without being significant) are reduced as  the size of the municipal
public sector increases. These results are coherent with the parameters obtained
for the variable family income per capita in the reduced form of the model.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
This paper analyses the impact of various factors on the local tax mix de-
termination. The empirical results obtained for the Spanish case suggest that
local governments react to the stimuli provided by tax exporting possibilities.
The incentive effect of the deductibility provokes an increase in the use of the
property tax but it seems not explain the substitution of user charges. The re-
sults also show how local governments tend to distribute the net tax burden in
order to improve its reelection chances. User charges are used more intensively
in communities with a more unequal income distribution and the opposite
happens with the residential property tax. The results show how the redistributi-
ve effect of the deductibility provokes an increase in the property tax use but
does not affect user charges use. We could conclude, therefore that, although
user charges are similar to a head tax in their distributive incidence, there must
be other characteristic features of that revenue source that make increase its
marginal cost function.
The reasons could be many, but it should be kept in mind that the u varia-
ble gather togheter a great diversity of charges and prices. As each of these
sources is earmarked to finance a specific expenditure program, the local go-
vernment capacity to increase the payments is severily limited by the taxpayers’
perception of the unit cost of the particular service to finance. Even accepting
that it is very difficult for the citisenship to be aware of local public service
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provision costs (Bradford, Malt and Oates [1969]), voters may have in their
minds some kind of connection between the charge payment and the cost of the
expenditure program that it is earmarked to. That is to say, even if in many of
those sources we can not speak strictly  about prices charged for local public
services, their treatment as a poll tax may be an oversimplification. It should be
remembered also that the increase in the use of the u variable  comes greatly
determined in the long run by the possibility of introducing new charges. We
think this could help also to explain the reason of the inferior character of this
figure found in the empirical analysis.
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APPENDIX 2:
Table 1. Estimation of  the reduced form model
(Property tax, User charges and Current revenue)
SURE-Fixed effects (200 obs.)
Variable p=P/N u=U/N r=R/N
  dm -7.693,62 944,39 -2.335,81
(-2,425)** (0,177) (-1,366)
G(Y) 543,41 -1.402,43 81,44
 (2,822)***  (-4,342)***  (0,784)
G(d) 1.136,20 -697,99 618,51
(2,824)*** (1,035) (2,852)***
 av/v 33,41 -23,92 -56,44
 (-4,591)***  (1,989)**  (1,438)+
v/y 1.277,37 -464,42 -2,545
(5,357)*** (-1,162) (0,0019)
  Y 4,11 -4,14 20,54
(2,133)** (-1,281) (1,980)**
  N -33,22 29,19 286,88
(-0,346) (-0,181) (0,554)
  S 23,14 238,81 718,62
(0,631) (3,886)*** (3,638)***
  M 1,41 20,62 260,95
(0,093) (0,816) (3,214)***
Log-likel.F. -3.708,07
  adj.- R2 0,789 0,502 0,743
  F-est. (C vs. Ci) 8,270*** 11,115*** 3,99***
  X2-Hausman
(f.e. vs r.e.)
44,507*** 1.117,2*** 88,55***
                          Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
           *** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
           ** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
                           * indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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Table  2. Estimation of the structural form model
  (Property tax and User charges)
3SLQ-Fixed effects (200 obs)
Variable p=P/R u=U/R p=P/N u=U/N
   dm -0,319 -0,055 -6,212 -1.850,83
(-2,634)*** (-0,279) (-1,576) (-0,244)
G(Y) 0,0046 -0,0285 480,94 -1.320,45
 (0,777)  (-3,025)***  (2,579)**  (-3,681)***
G(d) 0,0347 0,0334 715,28 1.462,03
(1,984)** (1,151) (1,245) (1,323)
a v/v 0,0013 -0,00071 38,092 -32,129
 (-4,758)***  (1,636)*  (-4,424)***  (1,939)*
 v/y 0,0286 -0,0123 1,346 -0,517
(3,973)*** (-1,043) (5,759)*** (-1,151)
 r=R/N -0,0066 -0,0081 72,921 -124,81
(-2,868)*** (-2,115)** (0,965) (-0,858)
  R2 0,531 0,419 0,612 0,533
               Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
           *** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
           ** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
                           * indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
